ma ei julge bändi fännata sest äkki must jääb kuidagi nõme mulje.

internetikommentaar

07/20/2013

zizek strong. remove analytics from discourse

dusdin congren

07/19/2013

Image

http://dusdincondren.com/

tajuhäire

07/19/2013

… ja erakonna logo peale paneme revolvri, sest me oleme turvalisuse erakond.

mudlum:

07/18/2013

tartu on nii ilus. tartlased käivad nii ilusasti riides.

war on things

07/18/2013

what if i told you that accidents are not just mere accidents but terrorist attacks of things against humans?

07/17/2013

So Hegel “cannot think the symptom” insofar as we understand the Cunning of Reason in its traditional teleological sense, as a hidden rational order controlling historical contingency, manipulatively exploiting particular moments in order to realize its hidden universal goal. However, the moment we take into account the retroactivity of universal necessity―the fact that each “use” of particular moments for some universal goal, as well as this goal itself, emerge retroactively in order, precisely, to “rationalize” the symptomal excess―we can no longer accept the Hegelian Cunning of Reason in its standard sense. In his early, Maoist-phase Theory of Contradiction, Badiou wrote: “To the nothing-new-under-the-sun, the thinking of revolt opposes the ever new insurgent red sun, under the emblem of which the unlimited affirmative hope of rebellious producers engenders ruptures.” This upbeat statement is supplemented by a much more ominous-sounding one: “There is the radically New only because there are corpses that no trumpet of Judgment will ever reawaken.”27 The shocking brutality of this last statement should not blind us to its truth: if we really want to assert a radical break, we must abandon the Benjaminian notion of retroactive redemption, of a revolutionary act which redeems all past suffering and defeats―as the Christians say, the dead should be left to bury the dead. No Cunning of Reason can retroactively justify present suffering, as in the Stalinist idea, elaborated by Merleau-Ponty in Humanism and Terror, that the good life of the communist future will justify the cruelty of the contemporary revolutionary process.

ENE

07/17/2013

a-dyn

e-herm

hern-kiru

kirv-maao

maap-pair

pais-rumo

rund-ting

tink-yver

täiendused. register.

stuff

07/17/2013

In his review of Badiou’s Ethics, Terry Eagleton wrote:There is a paradox in the idea of transformation. If a transformation is deep-seated enough, it might also transform the very criteria by which we could identify it, thus making it unintelligible to us. But if it is intelligible, it might be because the transformation was not radical enough. If we can talk about the change then it is not full-blooded enough; but if it is full-blooded enough, it threatens to fall outside our comprehension. Change must presuppose continuity―a subject to whom the alteration occurs―if we are not to be left merely with two incommensurable states; but how can such continuity be compatible with revolutionary upheaval?  The properly Hegelian solution to this dilemma is that a truly radical change is self-relating: it changes the very coordinates by means of which we measure change. In other words, a true change sets its own standards: it can only be measured by criteria that result from it. This is what the “negation of negation” is: a shift of perspective which turns failure into true success. And does the same not go for the Freudian Fehlleistung (acte manqué)―an act which succeeds in its very failure? Robert Pippin is right to emphasize that “the realization that only in such ‘failure’ is there success (success at being Geist) is an achievement like no other” in the history of philosophy. This is where the standard reproach to Hegel (that he fails to fully confront negativity, failure, collapse, etc., since there is always a mechanism of redemption built into the dialectical process which guarantees that the utter failure will magically be converted into its opposite) falls short: the story of the Hegelian dialectical reversal is not the story of failure as a blessing in disguise, as a (painful but necessary) step or detour towards the final triumph that retroactively redeems it, but, on the contrary, the story of the necessary failure of every success (of every direct project or act), the story of how the only “success” the subject can gain is the reflexive shift of perspective which recognizes success in failure itself.

it cannot die, unless you take its head, and with it, its power.

in the end there can be only one.